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Abstract 
The Scottish Legal system is a unique jurisdiction as jurors are able to give Not Proven 
verdicts in addition to the well-known Anglo-American verdicts (Guilty and Not Guilty). The 
Not Proven verdict has never been legally defined, meaning that currently legal practitioners 
can only estimate why a Not Proven verdict has been given. The main aim of this study was 
to investigate if jurors violate the regularity principle, which is commonly incorporated in 
many rational choice models, by testing if the introduction of the Not Proven verdict has an 
impact on the outcomes given by jurors. In addition, this study aims to test if the introduction 
of the Not Proven verdict has an impact upon how the Not Guilty verdict is perceived by 
jurors. In this study, 128 participants listened to two vignettes centred on homicide trials, 
jurors could give one of two verdicts in one of the vignettes and one of three verdicts in the 
other vignette. The vignettes were counterbalanced in regard to how many verdicts could be 
given at the end of them. It was found that jurors in a three-verdict system were less likely to 
give a Not Guilty verdict in comparison to jurors in a two-verdict system, showing that jurors 
violate the regularity principle and that the Not Proven verdict may change how the Not 
Guilty verdict is perceived. The current paper has implications in relation to juror 
communication, article six of the European convention of human rights and juror rationality. 
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The Bastard verdict and its influence on jurors. 
Introduction 
Development of the Not Proven verdict. 
The Scottish legal system is very different from other jurisdictions 1. For instance, within the 
Anglo-American legal system only the verdicts of Guilty and Not Guilty are available 2. 
Therefore, if the evidence does not provide proof beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the accused illegal act, then a Not Guilty verdict is appropriate 2. However, within 
the Scottish legal system, three-verdicts are available: Guilty, Not Guilty, and Not Proven. To 
understand how this system developed, we need to look back at the late 17th century and 
early 18th century 3. In this time period, jurors where only given the opportunity to make a 
decision on whether the charges were not proven or proven based on the evidence, and the 
judge decided on the guilt of the suspect 3. This system was introduced because from 1660 
onwards juries declined to give Guilty verdicts on oppressive laws 3, thus the introduction of 
this system was to attenuate the power of the jury. In the early 18th century, the ability of the 
jury to decide on the guilt of the defendant (i.e., give a Guilty or Not Guilty verdict) was re-
established 3. However, the Not Proven verdict remained, and consequently the Scottish 
three-verdict system was born.  
Scottish law does not define what a Not Proven verdict is, and judges have been deterred 
from helping jurors to interpret said verdict 4. It is believed, however, that the Not Proven 
verdict symbolises that proof of guilt has not been proven, whereas a Not Guilty verdict in 
the Scottish courtroom shows that jurors believe the suspect to be truly innocent 4; the current 
study aims to test these assumptions. Further, from a legal perspective, the Not Proven 
verdict has the same outcomes as the Not Guilty verdict (i.e., no custodial sentencing, the 
defendant is discharged and not subject to any sentence). 
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Review of Empirical studies surrounding the Not Proven verdict. 
Hope, Greene, Memon, Gavisk, and Houston 5 found that jurors in a three-verdict system (i.e., 
Not Proven, Guilty, and Not Guilty) were less likely to give a Not Guilty verdict in comparison 
to jurors in a two-verdict system (i.e., Guilty or Not Guilty). The estimate of guilt given for 
Not Proven verdicts, however, was not significantly higher (Not Proven M = 52.4%) than the 
estimates given for Not Guilty verdicts in either of the verdict systems (Not Guilty, two-verdict 
M = 42.4%; and, three-verdict M = 42.5%). This highlights that the Not Proven estimate of 
guilt given in Hope et al.’s 5 research was large enough to justify giving a Not Proven verdict 
over a Not Guilty verdict, but was not large enough to allow a Guilty verdict to be given. 
In addition, Hope et al. 5 demonstrated that irrespective of verdict or evidence weight, 
verdicts made in the three-verdict system allowed the mock jurors to feel more confident that 
they had reached the correct verdict than their binary verdict counterparts. Confidence does 
not always equal accuracy, however (Hall et al., 2007). Hope et al. 5 also found that the 
different verdict systems did not have a significant impact on the juror’s perception of guilt 
surrounding the defendant.  
Bhatia 6 found that if a third response is available which supports one of the original 
responses but not the other, then the option supported by the additional third response will be 
the response most likely to be chosen. For example, if one group of participants are asked 
which packet of crisps contained the highest fat content between a 150g bag of Walkers, a 
150g bag of Golden Wonder, or a 100g bag of Walkers, and a second group is asked which 
packet of crisps contained the highest fat content between a 150g bag of Walkers and a 150g 
bag of Golden Wonder, the first group would be more likely to choose the 150g bag of 
Walkers in comparison to the second group. Bhatia 6 has found this result consistently using 
his own tests and examples. 
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Bhatia 6 suggested that asymmetric dominance could explain these results. Asymmetric 
dominance essentially means that if an additional third option is added, which is recessive in 
one factor to one of the original options but similar to that same option in regard to another 
factor, and different to an alternative option, it will allow the similar yet dominant option to 
be considered the leading choice. In the crisp example above, the 150g bag of Walkers has a 
higher chance of being picked in the three-option condition in comparison to the two-option 
condition, as the additional third choice is made by the same company but is recessive in 
terms of weight. This research showed that the introduction of an extra option could cause 
differences in relation to which option is picked most frequently. 
If Bhatia’s 6 and Hope et al.’s 5 findings are taken together, an interesting conclusion can be 
drawn: that the introduction of a third option influences which option, out of an original 
binary set of options, is mostly likely to be chosen. Asymmetrical dominance, however, 
cannot explain the results found in Hope et al.’s 5 study, as the Not Proven verdict is similar 
to the Not Guilty verdict as both are acquittal options, but is also recessive to the Not Guilty 
verdict because it is not an outright acquittal. Nevertheless, the frequency of Not Guilty 
verdicts did not increase in the three-verdict system in comparison to the two-verdict system, 
thus showing that asymmetrical dominance may not fit in well within a juror setting. 
Smithson, Deady, Gracik 7 conducted a similar experiment to Hope et al. 5. Their first study 
investigated how the introduction of a third verdict may affect the verdict chosen, the belief 
of guilt and the difficulty of the decision in both a civil case surrounding negligence and a 
criminal trial focussed on murder. A significant association between the verdict that was 
given and the number of verdicts that were available was found, fewer Not Guilty and Guilty 
verdicts (to a lesser extent) were given in the three-verdict condition in comparison to the 
two-verdict condition; and, when the Not Proven verdict was available, significantly more 
guilty verdicts were given in comparison to not guilty verdicts 7. Once again, this suggests 
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that asymmetric dominance may not apply to the courtroom. Middling beliefs of guilt led to 
Not Proven verdicts, causing the beliefs of guilt associated with Not Guilty verdicts to be 
reduced in both trial types 7. 
Smithson et al.’s 7 second study replicated the study outlined above, but added guilty for 
Manslaughter as an additional potential verdict in one of the conditions. Within the study, 
there were three conditions: 1) Anglo-American two-verdict system (only guilty for murder 
verdict and not guilty verdict available); 2) the Scottish three-verdict system; and 3) a three-
verdict system where the third verdict was the guilty for Manslaughter verdict 7. It must be 
mentioned here that the guilty for Manslaughter verdict is not directly comparable with the 
Not Proven verdict, as the guilty for Manslaughter verdict may be used when the jury 
believes that the defendant caused the death of the victim but indent was not there; it is a 
conviction but for a lesser offence. It was found that Not Proven and guilty for Manslaughter 
verdicts seemed to push participants away from giving Not Guilty and guilty for murder 
verdicts, and both Not Proven and guilty for Manslaughter verdicts did not differ significantly 
in terms of similarity ratings when contrasted with guilty for murder verdicts. Their third 
study focussed on the similarities between each of the verdicts (guilty for murder, Not Guilty, 
guilty for Manslaughter and Not Proven), and found that guilty for Manslaughter verdicts 
were more similar to guilty for murder verdicts and that Not Proven verdicts were more 
similar to Not Guilty verdicts 7. In addition, Smithson et al.5 found that guilty for 
Manslaughter and guilty for murder verdicts did not differ significantly in relation to belief of 
guilt ratings. Not Proven verdicts had a significantly lower belief of guilt than Guilty verdicts, 
and Not Guilty verdicts gave a significantly lower belief of guilt than Not Proven verdicts. 
Decisions that led to Not Proven verdicts were also seen as being more difficult in 
comparison to decisions that led to other verdicts. Smithson et al.’s 7 research, therefore, 
suggests that the introduction of a third verdict has an impact on the verdict most likely to be 
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chosen, the difficulty of the task, and does not deter jurors away from Guilty verdicts. Their 
research, however, lacked a theoretical underpinning and used an Australian sample who may 
not be accustomed to the Not Proven verdict. 
This study considers the impact that a three-verdict system may have on jurors, but has not 
yet examined whether or not a three-verdict system would be beneficial. Jackson 2 used 
discursive analysis and semiotic analysis (the study of symbols) to show that the aims of a 
juror may differ in comparison to the legal system, and that the inclusion of the Not Proven 
verdict may change the meaning of the Not Guilty verdict. First, the layperson may see the 
jury as ontological fact finders, whereas legal professionals may see jurors as cognitive 
processors who use information to prove a certain verdict 2. Therefore, the Not Guilty verdict 
may mean one thing for a lawyer (that proof was lacking) and another for a juror (that the 
truth surrounding the innocence of the defendant has been discovered). 
In addition, Jackson 2 suggests that the definition of the Anglo-American verdicts may differ 
when another verdict is available. When a Guilty verdict is given in a two-verdict system, it 
could be said that the information supplied allowed guilt to be proven beyond reasonable 
doubt2. Conversely, Not Guilty verdicts in a two-verdict system can be given either when a 
jury believes that the person was truly innocent, or when a jury believes that the defendant 
was truly Guilty, but the evidence was lacking in relation to a conviction 2. This would then 
mean that acquitted individuals who are truly innocent might face social sanctions as the 
public may think that they were actually Guilty 2. 
One way to counter the above criticism of Not Guilty verdicts in a two-verdict system is to 
introduce the Not Proven verdict. The introduction of the Not Proven verdict would mean 
that individuals who have been given a Not Guilty verdict would face no social and no legal 
sanctions, as a jury of their peers have shown that they thought that the defendant’s innocence 
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has been proven 2. Therefore, the definition of the Not Guilty verdict is much more potent in 
the Scottish three-verdict system because juries have to, consciously, bypass both a Not 
Proven verdict to give it 2. Individuals who are given the Not Proven verdict will be free from 
legal sanctions as they are acquitted, yet may still face social sanctions due to the lack of 
confidence from the jury in relation to their innocence 2, 5. Hope et al.5 highlighted that jurors 
that are given the Not Proven verdict may face social sanctions, as 92% of their participants 
believed that defendant that were given the Not Proven verdict may suffer from stigma. In 
other words, the introduction of the Not Proven verdict may change what jurors interpret the 
Not Guilty verdict to mean. This may then mean that in a three-verdict system that the Not 
Guilty verdict is not an option given if the evidence does not show proof of guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt, and is rather a verdict given if the juror believes the evidence has shown 
proof of innocence. Further, the Not Proven verdict may replace the Not Guilty verdict and 
thus become the verdict that is given when a failure to meet the burden of proof has occurred. 
This may not have been the legal intention of the Not Proven verdict, but it may be the reality 
of what is occurring in the mind of a juror. The definition of the Guilty verdict should not 
differ between either of the verdict systems, however, as the Not Proven verdict does not 
directly compete with said verdict 2. This is because both the Not Proven verdict and the 
Guilty verdict have differing legal outcomes and therefore jurors are likely to see them as 
opposing verdicts 2. 
The inclusion of the Not Proven verdict arguably makes the Scottish system a more common 
sense option in comparison to its Anglo-American counterpart for assessing the guilt of a 
defendant 1. This is in the sense that it allows jurors to communicate to society what they 
believe the evidence has provided proof of (i.e., innocence, guilt, or nothing) rather than 
forcing a binary choice of guilty versus not when the juror may not feel that the evidence is 
sufficient to make that binary choice. One problem with the Not Proven verdict, however, is 
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that the public may wrongly think that an innocent defendant who has been given the Not 
Proven verdict is Guilty 2; thus, the Not Proven verdict does not solve the interpretation 
problems of the Not Guilty verdict (as mentioned earlier), it simply diverts the issue. In 
addition, Scottish jurors may confuse Not Proven verdicts with Not Guilty verdicts because 
of the similarities in legal outcomes, and this may cause some innocent individuals to suffer 
unwarranted social sanction 2. In other words, the Not Proven verdict may allow defendant to 
fairly be acquitted, but its ambiguity may cause defendants who receive said verdict to face 
social sanctions from the public2. Another criticism of the not proven verdict relates to the 
fact that it may undermine the presumption of innocence, thus meaning that it might break 
article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 8. 
Bhatia 6, Hope et al. 5 and Smithson et al. 7 suggest that the introduction of an additional, 
middle option has an impact on which verdict/option is chosen. These results taken together 
suggest that jurors, and general decision makers, may be violating the regularity principle. 
The regularity principle states the following: “the addition of an option to a choice set should 
never increase the probability of selecting an option from the original set” 9. The reason then 
that the regularity principle may have been violated was because if a Not Guilty verdict can 
be given in an initial choice set, then the same verdict should be given when the same (or 
similar) evidence is presented, regardless of the number of verdicts available 5. In addition, 
Hope et al.’s 5 study showed that the perception of guilt surrounding a defendant does not 
change across the verdict systems, which also highlights that jurors may be deviating from 
rational/normative models of decision making10. This is because normative/rational models 
would predict that a similar amount of information integration should lead to the same verdict 
being chosen 11, whereas Hope et al.’s 5 study found that the verdict system influenced the 
verdict chosen but not the perception of guilt surrounding the defendant given. 
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In summary, the current section has highlighted that the introduction of an additional option, 
such as the Not Proven verdict, can have an impact on verdict choice 6, 5, 2. In addition, Hope 
et al. 3 suggested that jurors violate the regularity principle, as the likelihood of choosing a 
Not Guilty verdict in an initial choice set (i.e., the two-verdict system) should not be altered 
by the inclusion of the Not Proven verdict. Hope et al. 5 also found that estimates of guilt 
surrounding the defendant did not differ significantly across the two-verdict systems, which 
further highlights that jurors may be deviating from rational norms. Therefore, the current 
research will test whether or not jurors deviate from rational norms by comparing belief of 
guilt ratings and the verdicts given across the Anglo-American system and the Scottish 
system. The current study has one research aim, which is to test whether or not any 
differences in relation to the total belief of guilt score exist between the different verdict 
systems. This research aim was developed to test if jurors are deviating from rational norms. 
The hypothesis for this section was: 
• Significantly fewer Not Guilty verdicts will be given in the three-verdict condition in 
comparison to the two-verdict condition. 
Method 
Design. 
This quasi-experiment adopted a one way within subjects design, the number of verdicts 
available (two vs three-verdict system) was used as a factor. The first dependent measure 
used in the current study was the total belief of guilt score and the second dependent measure 
used was the verdict given variable, which varied depending on the number of verdicts 
available condition. 
Counterbalancing of vignettes and factors. 
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Participants heard two vignettes in the current investigation; these vignettes were 
counterbalanced across participants. the number of verdicts available factor was also 
counterbalanced, half of the participants could give one of three-verdicts in the first vignette 
they heard (Guilty, Not Guilty or Not Proven) and one of two-verdicts in the second vignette 
they heard (Guilty or Not Guilty), and the other half of participants could one of two-verdicts 
in the first vignette they heard and one of three-verdicts in the second vignette they heard; the 
number of verdicts available condition that participants were placed in first was randomly 
assigned. 
Participant. 
The current study included 128 participants (female = 98). Participants were aged between 18 
and 61 years old (M =24.93, SD = 8.02). In this sample, 114 of the participants were students, 
the sample also consisted of other occupations, including but not limited to: academics, 
semiskilled workers and the unemployed. Only two inclusion/exclusion criteria were applied: 
• Are you eligible to vote? 
• And, are you eligible to be on a jury? 
Participants were recruited via opportunistic sampling through placing advertisements on a 
number of websites (e.g., Gumtree, Call for Participants, and Craigslist, Facebook and 
Twitter). 
Measure of guilt. 
Guilt was measured by asking participants to mark their belief of guilt on a visual guilt rating 
scale; see Figure 1. 
 Guilt Continuum 
100% Not Guilty                                                                                    100% Guilty 
 
<------------------------------------------------------------------------------> 
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Figure 1. Guilt rating scale. 
The guilt rating scale, which is a visual analogue scale, is 16 cm long; the bi-directional 
arrows within it are 14 cm long (each arrow spans 7cm from the centre point to the end). The 
far left of the guilt rating scale (marked with this arrow <) symbolises 100% Not Guilty and 
the far right of the guilt rating scale represents (marked with this arrow >) 100% Guilty. This 
scale was used so that participants could visually show how guilty they thought the defendant 
was, and so that the researcher could code these visual ratings of guilt into ratio data by 
measuring, with a ruler, how far the participants had marked their belief of guilt ratings from 
the Not Guilty arrow point on the far left. For example, if a participant marked their belief of 
guilt on the tip of the not guilty arrow, then their belief of guilt score would be zero, whereas 
if they marked said belief on the tip of the Guilty arrow, then their belief of guilt score would 
be 14. The rating of guilt score therefore had a possible range of 0-14 cm. Participants rated 
their belief of guilt after the opening statement, after each piece of evidence, and after each 
closing statement. All of these respective belief of guilt ratings were then summed to create a 
total belief of guilt score; this allowed the perception of guilt throughout the whole vignette 
to be measured. This total belief of guilt score had a potential range of 0-154; the higher this 
score was, the higher the belief of guilt was. Each participant gave two total belief of guilt 
scores, one for each of the two vignettes the participants heard. 
Vignettes. 
Development of vignettes. 
Two vignettes were developed, each with two versions to allow counterbalancing of 
information. The vignettes utilised in the current study were fictional, but were inspired from 
real life trials, and the information from these real life trials was gathered from court 
transcripts and newspapers. The researcher also attended a real life high court trial to make 
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sure that the vignettes used were structured like a real life trial. Literature on vignette 
development was consulted when designing the vignettes 11, 12. The two vignettes were 
designed to be the same length (i.e., 962 words long). Each of the vignettes were designed to 
contain an opening statement (130 words long for each of the vignettes) that provided 
context, four pieces of prosecution evidence, four pieces of defence evidence, and two 
closing statements (one from each stance).. The information presented in the two vignettes 
were similar in narrative: a female victim, a male defendant, a homicide trial, similar motives 
and the same evidence types were heard (e.g., DNA evidence, eyewitness testimony, expert 
testimony and secondary confessions). The only information that differed across the vignettes 
were names, ages and the specific details of the evidence and opening statements to improve 
generalizability. The ages of the victims and defendants, however, were comparable across 
the vignettes. 
Audio vignettes. 
Audio vignettes were constructed by employing a voice actor to read out the written vignettes 
in a quiet room at Edinburgh Napier University. Vignette one was either 5 minutes and 49 
seconds long or 5 minutes and 51 seconds long, depending on the counterbalancing version 
of the vignette. Vignette two was either 5 minutes and 56 seconds long or 6 minutes and 2 
seconds long, depending on the counterbalancing version of the vignette. Regardless of the 
slight time differences from editing, each version of a vignette provided the same pieces of 
information, and only the order of the evidence varied. The vignettes were recorded using 
theaudio recording app Dictaphone – Audio Recorder on an iPhone 5. The audio recording 
was then edited using the software Audacity. 
Audio playback device. 
The participants heard the vignettes in a quiet Psychology laboratory at Edinburgh Napier 
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University. The audio vignettes were saved as an mp3 file, and played using the software 
Windows Media Player. The participants heard the vignettes through Labtec Spin 95 
speakers. 
Verdict judgments. 
Once all the evidence had been provided in a vignette, participants were asked to give a final 
verdict, the verdicts that were available to them differed on the condition, thus allowing the 
within-subjects factor of the number of verdicts available (two-verdict system vs. three 
verdict system) to be created. Over this quasi-experiment, participants were presented with 
one vignette where they could give one of three-verdicts and another vignette where they 
could give one of two-verdicts. Counterbalancing of vignettes and factors’ for more 
information on how the verdicts available factor was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants were told which verdict options were available to them before starting each of 
the vignettes. 
Information sheet, consent form and debrief sheet. 
Standardised information sheets and debrief sheets made participants aware of the exclusion/ 
inclusion criteria, ethical issues (such as the right to withdraw and confidentiality), and who 
to contact if they need additional support. In addition, the consent forms allowed participants 
to consent to partaking in the pilot. 
Procedure. 
Participants read the standardised information sheet and completed the consent form within a 
quiet room in the Psychology Laboratory at Edinburgh Napier University. Once the consent 
form was signed, participant filled out the demographics questionnaire. Participants were 
then played the opening statement for the first vignette and were asked to state an initial/prior 
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rating of guilt by marking on the guilt rating scale (see Figure.1). They then heard the first 
piece of prosecution evidence and were asked to mark their belief of guilt rating again on 
another, fresh copy of the guilt rating scale. After this, participants heard the first piece of 
defence evidence, they were then asked to mark their belief of guilt on the guilt scale rating. 
This procedure of hearing evidence and giving a belief of guilt rating on the guilt rating scale 
was continued for the remaining six pieces of evidence (three for the prosecution and three 
for the defence). Once all of the evidence had been heard, the participants listened to two 
closing statements: one from the prosecution, which was heard first, and one from the 
defence. After hearing each of the closing statements, participants were asked to give their 
belief of guilt on the guilt rating scale. The participants were then given the following 
instructions from the judge: “Remember, to give a Guilty verdict you must think that the 
defendant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt”. Finally, participants were asked to give a 
verdict, the number of verdicts available to them depended on the condition (two-verdict 
condition = Guilty or Not Guilty; three-verdict condition = Guilty, Not Guilty, or Not 
Proven). Once the first vignette was completed, participants repeated this procedure with a 
second vignette. Once the participants had finished, they were given a debrief sheet and were 
asked to confirm that they were happy for their data to be analysed by ticking a box; no 
participants chose this withdrawal option. 
Ethics. 
The current study was granted ethical approval by the Research Integrity Committee in the 
School of Applied Sciences at Edinburgh Napier University. 
Results 
First, ANOVA will be reported which tested the effects that the number of verdicts avaialible 
had on the total belief of guilt score. Finally, two separate chi squares which investigated the 
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relationship that the number of verdicts available had with the verdicts given variable will be 
presented. 
Data Treatment for the total belief of guilt score. 
For each of the vignettes, all of the belief of guilt scores given were summed to create the 
total belief of guilt score. This meant that for the total belief of guilt score analysis each 
participant was counted twice. 
Descriptive statistics for the total belief of guilt score across  the number of verdicts 
available. 
Before inferential statistics could be conducted, descriptive statistics were explored. The data 
were found to be normally distributed, with minimal outliers present, thus allowing 
parametric testing to be applied. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the number of 
verdicts available (two versus three). 
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Table 1 highlighted that responses in the two-verdict condition were slightly higher in 
comparison to the three-verdict condition. 
Categorical data treatment. 
Initially, the number of verdicts available factor was treated as a within-subjects factors. 
However, this design violated the assumptions of the Chi-Square test of independence. The 
current researcher, therefore, replicated the analysis of Smithson et al. 7, who also 
investigated the effects of the inclusion of the Not Proven verdict, by only analysing the first 
verdict returns. These first verdict returns were counterbalanced across the number of 
verdicts available factor. In addition, the first verdict returns were also counterbalanced 
across the different vignettes. This data treatment allowed the number of verdicts available 
factor to be treated as a between-subjects factors, thus allowing the assumptions of the Chi- 
Square test of independence to be met. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for the number of verdicts available factor across the total 
belief of guilt score. 
Total belief of guilt score 
Variable Name Mean 
 
Standard Deviation 
  
The Number of 
Verdicts Available 
Condition:  
     
Two  82.90 24.92 
Three 80.75 
 
25.36 
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Testing the effects that each factor the number of verdicts available had on the total 
belief of guilt score. 
Results comparing the total belief of guilt score across the factors. 
To test the effects that the number of verdicts available factor had on the total belief of guilt 
scale, one paired samples t-test was conducted. The paired samples t-test investigated the 
effects of the number of verdicts available factor on the total belief of guilt score, and it was 
found that no significant main effect existed [t (127) = .756, p = .45, d = .12]. 
Investigation of the association between the verdict given variable and the number of 
verdicts available. 
When investigating the relationship between the verdict given and the number of verdicts 
available, two separate Chi-Square tests of independence were conducted. In the first, Not 
Proven verdicts were combined with Not Guilty verdicts. In the second, Not Proven verdicts 
were combined with Guilty verdicts. This was conducted as Not Proven verdicts could not be 
given in the two-verdict system, yet the Chi-Square test of independence would have still 
produced an estimated frequency for Not Proven verdicts within the two-verdict system, this 
would have nullified the results of said test. In addition, Hope et al. 5 used a similar method 
of analysis when testing the relationship between the verdict that was given and the number 
of verdicts available. 
When Not Proven verdicts were combined with Guilty verdicts, it was found that jurors in the 
three-verdict condition (23.5%) were significantly less likely to reach a Not Guilty verdict in 
comparison to jurors in the two-verdict condition (76.5%) [x2 (1) = 23.76, p <.001, ɸ =.43]. 
In addition, when Not Proven verdicts were combined with Not Guilty verdicts, it was found 
that jurors in the three-verdict condition (41.9%) gave fewer Guilty verdicts than jurors in the  
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two-verdict condition (58.1%), this association was found not to be significant though [x2 (1) 
= 1.72, p =.19, ɸ =.12]. In summary, the inclusion of the Not Proven verdict reduces the 
likelihood of the Not Guilty verdict being chosen. 
Discussion 
Statement of principal findings 
The current section will first discuss whether or not the number of verdicts available 
influenced the number of Not Guilty verdicts given. Then, this section will discuss if the 
number of verdicts available influenced juror perceptions of guilt. Finally, the implications of 
these results will be discussed. 
 First, it was found that jurors in the three-verdict condition were significantly less likely to 
give Not Guilty verdicts in comparison to jurors in the two-verdict condition, thus allowing 
the hypothesis to be accepted. Both Hope et al. 5 and Smithson et al. 7 found the same result 
in their own previous research. In addition, it was found in the current study that Guilty 
verdicts were equally likely across the two conditions. These two results taken together 
support Smithson et al.’s 7 conclusion that the Not Proven verdict does not sway jurors away 
from the Guilty verdict, and rather that the Not Proven verdict decreases the number of Not 
Guilty verdicts given. This decrease in Not Guilty verdicts when the Not Proven verdict is 
available highlights that jurors are deviating from the regularity principle, which is a key 
component of many rational choice models 5. This is because if jurors are shown the 
same/similar pieces of evidence, it would be expected that the initial set of verdict options 
(i.e., Guilty and Not Guilty) should be given with the same frequency regardless of whether a 
Not Proven verdict is included or not. The current section will now discuss possible 
explanations for this deviation from what the rational choice model would expect. 
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In addition, the current study wanted to investigate if the different verdict systems had a 
significant effect on the perception of guilt; no significant difference was found. Hope et al. 5 
found that juror estimates of guilt surrounding the defendant did not differ in the two-verdict 
condition in comparison to the three-verdict condition, thus the current study’s findings 
provide support to Hope et al.’s 5 results. 
Meaning of the study: possible mechanisms and implications for clinicians or 
policymakers 
The results from the current investigation suggested that asymmetrical dominance (see Bhatia 
6) did not occur in the current study, as the availability of the similar, yet recessive, Not 
Proven verdict did not increase the number of Not Guilty verdicts given. The decrease in the 
number of Not Guilty verdicts given in the three-verdict system in comparison to the two-
verdict system may indicate that the Not Guilty verdict is interpreted differently in the three-
verdict system than it is the two-verdict system 2. The Not Guilty verdict may be given on 
two scenarios in the two-verdict system: 1) if the juror truly believes the defendant is 
innocent; and 2) when the juror believes that the defendant is probably guilty, but there is not 
enough evidence to convict 2. However, in the three-verdict system, jurors may only give a 
Not Guilty verdict when the juror truly believes that the defendant is innocent, and any doubt 
concerning the innocence of the defendant may lead to a Not Proven verdict 5, 2. Further, the 
inclusion of the Not Proven verdict may allow members of the jury to communicate their 
belief of guilt more adequately to the courtroom 2. 
This change in interpretation of the Not Guilty verdict may provide support for bounded 
rationality. Simon 13 coined the term bounded rationality, and suggested that both the 
environment and the decision maker’s cognition interact when a decision is being made. 
Therefore, a change in the number of verdict options available may change the juror decision 
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making context, which may change how a juror interprets the Not Guilty verdict (i.e., a 
change in cognition) and this may then influence the final verdict that is reached. The Guilty 
verdict frequency did not significantly differ across the different conditions, however, which 
might suggest that the introduction of the Not Proven verdict does not change how the Guilty 
verdict is interpreted 2. This may be because the Not Proven verdict is an additional acquittal 
verdict, and has no direct competition with Guilty verdicts 5, 2. One negative implication from 
the findings in the current study is that truly innocent individuals in the three-verdict system 
may have a shadow placed over their innocence 2, as they will be less likely to receive a Not 
Guilty verdict in comparison to their two-verdict counterparts. Further, Hope et al. 5 found 
that their participants believed that a defendant that was given a Not Proven verdict would 
face more social stigma than a defendant that was given a Not Guilty verdict, and this could 
have severe implications for truly innocent defendants given Not Proven verdicts in serious 
crimes such as homicide. In addition, the inclusion of the Not Proven verdict may mean that 
jurors do not start a trial with a “presumption of innocence”, which may limit how fair a trial 
the defendant is given, and this may break article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 8, 5. Therefore, the Not Proven verdict may help jurors to communicate their belief of 
guilt to the court, but said verdict may have a negative impact on both human rights and truly 
innocent individuals. 
In summary, the current study showed that the number of verdicts available did not have a 
significant impact on juror perceptions of guilt, but did influence the amount of Not Guilty 
verdicts given. These results have two theoretical implications. The first was that jurors do 
not make rational decisions. Jurors were presented with the same/similar pieces of 
information, and the perception of guilt did not differ across the two different verdict 
systems. Therefore, if jurors were being rational, it would be expected that the initial decision 
set (Guilty and Not Guilty) would be chosen with the same frequency regardless of whether 
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or not the Not Proven verdict was included. This did not occur, however, suggesting that 
jurors were deviating from the regularity principle, which is part of many rational choice 
models 5. The second was that bounded rationality might explain why jurors deviate from 
what would be expected in rational choice models. Simon 13 and, more recently, Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein 14 have suggested that cognitive processes are simplistic and have evolved to 
adapt to an ever changing environment. Therefore, if the juror environment changes (i.e., a 
Not Proven verdict is included) then cognition may change (i.e., the interpretation of the Not 
Guilty verdict may change), meaning that similar perceptions of guilt may lead to different 
verdicts being chosen (Not Proven over Not Guilty). 
Strengths and weaknesses of the study 
One limitation of the current research was related to ecological validity, as a number of 
factors that occur in a courtroom cannot be replicated in juror decision experiments. For 
instance, an experiment cannot last as long as a real trial does, participants volunteer to take 
part in juror studies whereas an authoritative institution requests real life jurors, and mock 
jurors make decisions in a laboratory at a university rather than through a deliberation in a 
courtroom. Therefore, the extent to which the current study mirrors a real life courtroom may 
be limited, and the researchers acknowledge this. In addition, the current study only focussed 
on juror decision making rather than focussing on jury decision making and the deliberation 
process. This once again limits the extent to which the jurors in the current study experienced 
a similar environment to real life jurors.  
However, the current design and focus (i.e., on jurors rather than jury) was chosen for a 
number of reasons. First, jurors were chosen to be studied rather than juries as this was only 
the third paper investigating how jurors use the Not Proven verdict (and was the first 
experiment on said topic in the last 10 years). Therefore, the authors wanted to investigate 
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how individual jurors used the Not Proven verdict before they subsequently studied how the 
Not Proven verdict was used in deliberations.  
 Second, an experimental design was chosen as this allowed the researchers to manipulate 
how many verdicts were shown to the jurors, and was the only method open to the authors as 
real life trials cannot be studied. As previously mentioned these trials were shorter than real 
life trials and the trials were displayed to the participants through audio rather than the jurors 
seeing the trials. Nevertheless, a number of previous pieces of research have highlighted that 
the ecological validity of mock trials does not have an impact on the decision outcome or 
process 15. For instance, research by Pesdek, Avila-Mora and Sperry 15 showed that 
culpability ratings were not impacted on by the medium (audio vs. visual) in which the cases 
were presented. Further, psychologists such as Watt and Quinn 16 have suggested that the 
environment does not have an impact on cognitive mechanisms, such as decision making, and 
rather the cognitive mechanism will act the same regardless of the environment. In other 
words, jurors will use the same decision processes in a mock setting as they will in a real life 
setting; only the experience will differ.  
In addition to these theoretical justifications for the methodology, the authors designed the 
vignettes in line with best-practice methodological literature on designing vignettes for 
research, as describes in detail in the method section. Information was collected about trials 
from newspapers and court transcripts, this information was then used as inspiration to create 
the vignettes, and finally all of the team provided input in the final design of the vignettes. 
While this was appropriate for the purpose and scope of the current research, future research 
should hope to extend the ecological validity of the current study. The researchers of this 
paper are also excited to see whether the results of the Chalmers, Leverick and Munro study, 
which is currently ongoing and has achieved the unusual privilege of accessing real jurors to 
investigate jury decision making, will coincide with our own.   
25 
 
In summary, only through simulation can juror and jury decision making be researched. 
Researchers can only see what variables/factors have an impact on the decision making 
processes and outcomes of jurors through controlled (quasi) experiments. In addition, real life 
jurors cannot be observed in the UK because of the contempt of court rule.  Furthermore, 
mock juror (or jury) simulations are the best psychologists can do just now, and that is why 
the current methodology was chosen. 
Unanswered questions and future research 
A future line of enquiry from the current study relates to how other additional verdicts may 
influence verdict choice. For instance, the current study found that the inclusion of the Not 
Proven verdict significantly decreases the number of Not Guilty verdicts given, and Smithson 
et al. 7 found that the option of Manslaughter decreased the chances of the defendant being 
found guilty of murder, and decreased the amount of Not guilty verdicts given. Future 
research could investigate how other additional verdicts, such as the Not Guilty but insane – a 
special verdict 7, influence verdict choice. In addition, other jurisdictions have different legal 
proceedings; in Spain, the judge presents a series of propositions and the jury decides proven 
or not proven to each of said propositions 17. Therefore, future research could investigate 
whether or not differences in legal proceedings influence the decision making of jurors. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the current study showed that the number of verdicts available did not have a 
significant effect on the total belief of guilt score. However, it was found that the inclusion of 
the Not Proven verdict did make jurors less likely to give a Not Guilty verdict; this has 
positive implications concerning juror’s abilities to communicate their belief of guilt to the 
court. Furthermore, in tradition with bounded rationality, the current study has provided 
insight into the effects that the legal environment may have on both juror perceptions of guilt 
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and the verdict outcomes reached by jurors. Based upon this I would recommend that the 
Scottish legal system keep the bastard verdict.  
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